Given Proton Mail’s fashiness coming out of the woodwork, lots of folks are looking at switching away — but they have a reasonable concern: Aren’t Proton Mail’s privacy features special, different from a normal mail provider?
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@august
Per the security paper above, it’s not clear to me that the secret key really •is• secret from the provider at all times.Regardless, I would expect that the ingress problem means that a very large portion of traffic is available for subpoena in practice.
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Arp Laszlo • Comics • AuDHDreplied to Paul Cantrell last edited by [email protected]
@inthehands I switched to Proton because I didn’t want Google knowing everything about me, and because DIY mail servers are a pita wrt email delivery. But I’d consider an alternative if a good one existed. I’ve heard of Tuta but I dunno much about them.
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@inthehands Oh that’s a good point, I misunderstood that you were looking at this specific feature, rather than the overall benefit of using an E2EE provider when 99.9% of emails one sends / receives is not E2EE.
idk how their passphrase-locked mail is technically different than something like https://wormhole.app
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@inthehands kinda hard to have a valid opinion about something if you don't use it.
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@rommix0
Through the magic of reading -
@august
Yeah. I think the difference is that Proton does a lot of work to make the encryption a bit more invisible. I'm not sure that’s a good thing: in a context where lots/most of the traffic isn’t encrypted, creating a more porous boundary between what •is• and what isn't doesn’t seem great. -
@inthehands I completely agree that it’s a weird and niche product category, because there aren’t many people who would pay significantly more for an objectively worse email client experience, under the promise that subverting this ONE confidentiality trust point would result in the complete collapse of their product and that they are full of employees who would whistleblow at the first whiff of it. That trust is a fragile and political thing and Proton’s founder really tarnished it
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@august
Exactly. It’s really trust, not technology, that they are selling. That was the core product. And now…. -
Paul Cantrellreplied to Paul Cantrell last edited by [email protected]
A very good point from @august here:
https://macaw.social/@august/113839019107602863Proton Mail’s core product isn’t really technology; it’s •trust•.
And with a few rash words, their CEO has severely damaged that core product.
Yes, it was only a few words — but what else do we have to go on? If they’re doing something shady behind closed doors, we won't know about it until it’s far, far too late. The best we can do is just assume that where there’s smoke there’s fire.
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@inthehands I didn't think this is quite correct. They don't have an SMTP server that they host. You can run a bridge locally that let's you use a standard client, but they do not host an SMTP (or IMAP) server.
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scrottie (he/him/they)replied to Paul Cantrell last edited by
@inthehands Pardon the footnote, and in no way to meant to defend ProtonMail (I did a "fuck ProtonMail" post the other day), but LTS/SSL is great for protecting you from random baddies but not powerful state actors. We believe the NSA has the power to crack the popular recommended ECDSA curves used, and VeriSign has just signed certs for the FBI, which is a massive backdoor. I don't know if GPG/PGP's encryption has held up, but that was what we were using (and some people still do) for E2E email
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@sdwilsh
Ah, that is useful, thank you! My understanding had been that the local bridge was optional, but indeed, looks like you •have• to use their mobile app. -
scrottie (he/him/they)replied to scrottie (he/him/they) last edited by
@inthehands That doesn't give you privacy on who you are talking to (and also doesn't guard against disclosure after recipients have decrypted email from you) and the whole identity thing is bad as much as some people like key singing parties. But it isn't a black box, and doesn't attempt to do dodgy key escrow like stuff that ProtonMail does. So maybe I'll go put my public key in my profile or something again. "Move discussion elsewhere" is a good idea but it's also often observed that...
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@inthehands @august As Alex Lindsay pointed out in the latest episode of TWiT (https://overcast.fm/+AAZarRN184U) — in the context of Sonos — trust arrives on foot, but leaves by horse.
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@tantramar @august
That’s a great quote. -
scrottie (he/him/they)replied to scrottie (he/him/they) last edited by
@inthehands with things like Signal, the platform you're running it on may be the weakest link. Broadcom etc broadband processors are considered back doored even if you install a 3rd party Android fork and trust the 3rd party app store's apk.
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scrottie (he/him/they)replied to scrottie (he/him/they) last edited by
@inthehands Someone suggested in response to my thread that this might be badjacketing of ProtonMail to shepherd people to less secure things; that makes me wonder if ProtoMail itself wasn't an attack to steer people away from GPG.
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@inthehands @august don't forget that in the case of using a web interface, you have no guarantees that the JavaScript sent to you is the same JavaScript that was sent to someone else, or even the same that was sent to you yesterday. So if you want to target an individual, you can just ship a special version of the code that includes a line saying "and now send the private key unencrypted to the NSA", and you're unlikely to ever notice.
With downloaded apps such as signal (even signal desktop), this attack is far more difficult to pull off (but not mitigated fully if you want updates regularly)
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Paul Cantrellreplied to scrottie (he/him/they) last edited by
@scrottie
Bottom line is (1) you •have• to trust someone somewhere if you want secure communication, and (2) there’s basically no upper limit to the amount of paranoia about technology that can find technical justification if you’re willing to speculate.I don’t •necessarily• assume, for example, that Broadcomm is backdoored. Passive void “considered” doing a lot of work there; considered by whom? But if I were, say, doing human rights work targeted by a hostile state actor…then yeah, I would have to start working under the assumption that Broadcomm could be compromised. No upper limit.
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@Tutanota @heymarkreeves @inthehands I have one: what protections do you offer to your users against "Five Eyes"?