user stories i wish had more consideration
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@trwnh I think that's part of the reason for the choice to go with a different protocol. I guess you could still have some kind of proxy service like there is for DOIs: you have an URI that is doi:prefix/suffix and then you have the HTTP proxy https://doi.org/prefix/suffix that redirects to the known HTTP URL of the document. We could have a similar scheme, but only as long as alternative resolution mechanisms are also provided.
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@oblomov sure, DOI works as long as the DOI organization remains solvent and as long as there is a consistent database or lookup table for doi: -> https: or whatever.
i don't think the answer is "force everyone to obtain a DOI prefix before being able to publish on the web" though. i mean you could do that, but that in effect creates the "doi network" or "doi web" instead of the current "http(s) web" that we call "the Web" or "World Wide Web"
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@trwnh sorry, I didn't meant it like that, I meant it in a way similar to how DOI works in the sense that the URI could exist without the doi.org domain, and the doi.org domain is essentially a proxy to resolve doi: URIs into HTTP URLs. I think the DID idea could work in a similar way, which is what I think the PLC DID from BS is intended to be, but I'd like it to be “decentralized first”, with the HTTP proxy only useful for the transition.
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@trwnh this BTW is also why I'm not to fond the RNS idea (same issue as with DOI and PLC), unless again it's “distributed first” (hence the Kademlia idea). I'm not sure why you're opposed to keys as IDs, but whatever the choice is, it should still provide some key information simply to ensure validity.
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@oblomov instead of inseparably coupling "key as id" i would prefer "key to prove controllership of an id" or "key to prove a message was not tampered with". you should be able to rotate keys without it destroying the entire identity graph. you should be able to use different keys for different purposes.
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@trwnh OK, but the ID still needs some crytographic element to allow keys to prove controllership of id? Or how would a key be used to prove control?
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@oblomov where RNS differs from PLC is that the server you ask to do the lookup is arbitrary, instead of being centralized and hardcoded. you get a ship of theseus issue ("it is whatever i say it is" / "depends on who you ask") but DNS largely has this issue as well and there are ways of mitigating it (authoritative servers, dnssec, ...)
also in RNS the scheme can be anything, not just https.
the "network" becomes whatever set of RNS servers agree on something. you could ask multiple, i guess?
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@trwnh am I reading it correctly that it sounds a bit like how the eDonkey network works? You can connect to any server, and then search for resources (file hashes in that case) and you'll get a more or less uniform view of the network anyway, modulo massive netsplits?
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@oblomov same way we do right now, link to the key within some identity document or "controller document". if the signature or challenge validates then a message came from the controller of that uri
identity documents could even be passed around p2p with an introducer model
failing that, keyservers could exist to let you lookup keys and link them back to other ids
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@oblomov i dont know enough about edonkey or kademlia to answer further about those, but i will read into those and see if there are any similarities or lessons to be learned, thank you!
